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Irreconcilable Principles: Minority Rights,
Inunigration, and a Religious State
ABIGAEL C. BOSCH*
ABSTRACT
A state formed to attract immigrant settlement in the aftermath of
World War II, Israel was founded as an explicitly Jewish, yet democratic
state. Israel's democratic and Zionist motivations are readily identifiable
in its Declaration of Independence and have pervaded the country's legal
landscape since its establishment. In recent years, however, the steady
influx of African asylum seekers traveling to Israel in hopes of securing a
better life have proven difficult for Israel to manage. Israel's commitment
to preserving the state's Jewish character while still maintaining
traditional democratic principles like equality creates a scenario where
the so-called "infiltrator" asylum seekers may be reluctant to enter and
remain, thereby forcing other countries to absorb them.
INTRODUCTION
Immigration is a phenomenon that has particularly global
implications.' Absorbing noncitizens, either temporarily or
permanently, affects a state's culture, society, and economy. 2 Similarly,
a state that encourages citizens from other states to relocate elsewhere,
intentionally or not, misses a valuable opportunity to gain human
capital and diversify its body of citizens.
* Senior Managing Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume
24; JD Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2017. The views
expressed in the article are the author's alone. I am immensely grateful for my
friends and mentors who offered their support during this process, and I specifically
thank Professor Seth Lahn for his encouragement and guidance throughout my
endeavors.
1. See Yaffa Zilbershats, Sovereign States Control of Immigration: A Global Justice
Perspective, 43 ISR. L. REv. 126, 128 (2010).
2. See id. at 148, 153-54; Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229, 240-241, 245-246 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
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Despite these global effects, immigration is often regulated at the
state level.3 Sovereign states have almost complete control over their
immigration policies. 4 In most cases, any noncitizen who wishes to enter
a state, whether as an immigrant or as a tourist, is at the mercy of the
state's discretion.5 That discretion might be based on a wide array of
considerations: the safety of the state in allowing more people within its
borders, the cost of permitting a person to enter, and the potential
economic and social gains that such entry may entail. 6 Whatever the
rationale, a state's immigration policy is up to the state itself.7
Unsurprisingly, the determination of why a person should or should
not be allowed within a state's borders often accompanies considerations
of the state's cultural character, whether implicitly or explicitly written
into its immigration policy.8 For example, Israel, allows persons of a
particular background to be more easily admitted into the state- the
Right of Return, a founding principle of the state, permits every Jew
worldwide to immigrate to Israel.9 This form of positive law ensures the
state a large degree of control while avoiding the criticized aspects of
negative immigration law, which denies a group entry based on its
ethnicity or heritage.10 In addition, a state can prevent certain groups
from settling within its borders by means other than explicit negative or
positive law. One way to discourage immigration or encourage
emigration, for example, is by disadvantaging the foreign party both
socially and economically."
3. Zilbershats, supra note 1, at 128.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 133.
7. Id. at 128.
8. See id. at 133.
9. See Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli
Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 234 (1999); The Law of Return, 5710-1950, § 1, 4 LSI 114
(Isr.).
10. See Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in
Immigration Selection: 120 Years After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT.
237, 260-61 (2010); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, SELECTING BY ORIGIN: ETHNIC MIGRATION IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 220-24 (2005) (contrasting the U.S. ban on Asian immigrants with Israel's
Law of Return).
11. See Zilbershats, supra note 1, at 137-38 (describing how people are motivated to
avoid negative phenomena like "persecution of religious and ethnic minorities and the
denial of their human rights; various forms of political oppression; starvation and
exploitation of the population in the homeland; inequality of women and subjection"); As
Sweden Offers Shelter, Denmark Tries to Discourage Refugees, PBS NEWSHOUR, (Sept. 4,
2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/sweden-offers-shelter-denmark-tries-
discourage-refugees/ (suggesting that a refugee may choose not to immigrate based on the
relative threat to his wellbeing in a given country based on things like sexuality, draft
susceptibility, and so forth).
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As a state formed to attract immigrant settlement in the wake of
World War II, Israel presents a curious case for review. Established in
1948, Israel was founded based on two main principles. First, Israel was
established as a Jewish state. In this respect, Israel focuses on
preserving three Zionist tenets: "(1) the right of return, i.e., the right of
every Jew to immigrate to Israel; (2) the maintenance of a Jewish
majority in the State, and (3) a connection between the Diaspora and
the State of Israel." 12 Second, Israel was founded a democratic state. 13
By definition, Israel also seeks to protect "the principles of social
equality and respect for the individual within the community." 14 These
democratic and Zionist motivations are readily identifiable in Israel's
Declaration of Independence and have pervaded Israel's legal landscape
since its establishment in 1948.
Despite Israel's proclaimed commitment to democratic principles,
various instances of rights discrimination in the state's short history-
often and obviously related to the Middle East Conflict- have
prevented the non-Jewish minority from achieving the same rights as
Jewish Israelis.15 As recently as 2011, Israel has considered formal
legislation that benefits its Jewish majority at the expense of non-
Jewish Israelis. On August 3, 2011, forty of Israel's Knesset members
signed a proposal that sought to interpret the phrase "Jewish and
democratic state," which appears in Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty. Most notably, the proposal defined Israel as the nation
state of the Jewish People.16 According to one source, "[t]hat not only
means that the country's national holidays are Jewish religious holidays
or that the flag is the Magen David; it also means that Jewish law will
be the inspiration for Israel's legal system ... ."
12. David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 39,
42 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).
13. See The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3
(Isr.) [hereinafter Declaration of Israel], available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreign
policy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%/o2Oisra
el.aspx.
14. Democracy, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html
?q=democracy (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
15. See generally Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics ofRights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 3
ISR. STUD 80 (1998) (describing the development of individual rights in Israel); Yaacov
Ben-Shemesh, Immigration Rights and the Demographic Consideration, 2 L. & ETHICS
HuM. RTS. 1 (2008) (reviewing how Israel's commitment to maintaining a substantial
Jewish majority has affected rights of the non-Jewish minority).
16. Jonathon Lis, Lawmakers Seek to Drop Arabic as One of Israel's Official
Languages, HAARETZ, (Aug. 4, 2011, 2:14 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/lawmakers-seek-
to-drop-arabic-as-one-of-israel-s-official-languages-1.376829.
17. Israel's Jewish Nation-State Bill: A Primer, HAARETZ (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:08 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.628365. The first draft of the Basic Law asserted
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In addition, the steady influx of African asylum seekers traveling to
Israel in the past decade has made it even more difficult for Israel to
retain its Jewish character while preserving democratic principles.
According to a report issued by Israel's Population and Immigration
Authority (PIA) in April 2015, "nearly 65,000 Africans crossed illegally
into Israel between 2006 and 2013."18 These "infiltrators"-as Israel
refers to them-have reportedly "created fear that the demographic
changes resulting from a wave of impoverished Africans, mostly
Muslims from Sudan and Christians from Eritrea, would overwhelm the
Jewish nature of the state."'9 Israel's treatment of the African entrants
has been controversial: the state has authorized prolonged detention of
asylum seekers and has built two detention camps to hold them while
their applications for asylum are processed. 20 Applications often take
years to be reviewed and are rarely granted-less than one percent of
asylum applications submitted since 2009 have been accepted. 21
Moreover, African asylum seekers have been subject to pervasive racial
violence and harassment. 22
Because the quality of life a person may achieve in a state is
undoubtedly related to the willingness of minority groups to settle and
stay there, Israel's attitude toward its non-Jewish inhabitants is of
critical importance to its immigration system. This Note argues that
Israel's commitment to preserving the state's Jewish character while
still maintaining traditional democratic principles like equality creates
a scenario where non-Jewish immigrants-often Arabs or African
asylum seekers-may be reluctant to enter and non-Jewish Israelis may
that Israel should establish ethnic communities where every resident can preserve their
culture and heritage, that the Hebrew language would be considered the only official
language of the State of Israel (while the Arabic language would be of a special status),
that the Hebrew calendar would become the official calendar of the state of Israel, and
that the Hebrew law would serve as an inspiration to Israeli legislators. Id. In order to
make the new legislation more palatable to those who value the country's democracy,
however, both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni
proposed watered-down versions of the bill. Id.
18. Refugee Law and Policy: Israel, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help
/refugee-law/israel.php#_ftnref43 (last updated June 21, 2016).
19. Id. (citing William Booth, Israeli Government to Refugees: Go Back to Africa or Go
to Prison, WASH. POST (May 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle
east/toughening-its-stance-toward-migrants-israel-pushes-africans-to-
leave/2015/05/14/el637bce-f350-11e4-bca5-2lb5lbbdf93estory.html
[https://perma.cc/7SWT-Q2L3] (internal quotations omitted)).
20. Can Israel Have a Fair Asylum Law Without Confronting the Nakba?, NAKBA FILES






be reluctant to stay. It examines how Israel's disparate treatment of its
Jewish and non-Jewish residents is in part the result of Israel's
irreconcilable founding principles as a Jewish, democratic state.
Although not the only factor influencing immigration, of course, Israel's
treatment of its non-Jewish population and its commitment to
preserving Israel's Jewish character showcases how democracy,
individual rights, and immigration policy intersect. The effects of that
intersection in the global legal context show that seemingly permissive
immigration laws may be weakened by structures within a state that
indirectly discourage immigrants from starting a new life within a
particular state.
Part I of this Note reviews the purposes for which Israel was created
and how it is perceived by the majority and minority populations. Part I
explains how Israel's irreconcilable founding principles render the
Supreme Court's democratic role as a protector of rights particularly
difficult to accomplish. Part I goes on to argue that because Israel's
government is dominated by the Jewish majority, the state's
commitment to Zionist goals will almost always prevail over democratic
principles.
Part II describes how the Supreme Court balanced Israel's
competing interests to protect individual rights before formal civil rights
legislation even existed. Next, Part II analyzes how the enactment of
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty changed Israel's civil rights
discourse. It then discusses how Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
ultimately did little to prevent Israel's irreconcilable principles from
thwarting minority rights in the late twentieth century.
Part III connects Israel's treatment of minority rights to the state's
immigration policy, and examines three major sources of immigration
law: Israel's Law of Return, a form of positive law that encourages
Jewish settlement; 23 the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, a
negative law that forbids certain Palestinians from settling within
Israel's borders; 24 and the Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and
Jurisdiction) Law, a law designed to ensure heightened supervision of
and control over Israel's borders.25 Part III then analyzes how these
laws both contribute to the clash between Israel's founding principles
and decrease the Israel Supreme Court's protection of minority rights.
23. See Dan Ernst, The Meaning and Liberal Justifications of Israel's Law of Return,
42 IsR. L. REV. 564, 564-65 (2009).
24. Albert K. Wan, Note, Israel's Conflicted Existence as a Jewish Democratic State:
Striking the Proper Balance Under the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, 29 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 1345, 1346 (2004).
25. Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, 8 LSI 133
(5714-1953/54), available at httpsJ/www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgjsountfHistory/19541aw.pdf
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Through this examination, it becomes clear that the paradoxical
definition of a Jewish, democratic state discourages non-Jewish persons
from settling or staying in Israel by leaving little room for minority
rights protection in Israel's highest court.
Finally, Part IV of this Note analyzes how this implicit
discouragement, combined with Israel's explicit laws that encourage
Jewish immigration to the state while banning certain non-Jewish
immigration, causes Israel's non-Jewish residents to emigrate to other
states near and far. In addition, it assesses how Israel's treatment of
minority settlers encourages immigrants to seek entry into other states.
It further argues that Israel's attitude toward non-Jewish citizens and
non-Jewish immigrants most obviously adds to the insurmountable
conflict between Jews and non-Jews in the Middle East and worldwide.
I. ISRAEL'S IRRECONCILABLE FOUNDING PRINCIPLES
THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish
immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will
foster the development of the country for the benefit of
all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice
and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will
ensure complete equality of social and political rights to
all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it
will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language,
education and culture. 26
Excerpted above, Israel's Declaration of Independence identifies the
country's two main founding principles: first, Israel is a home to Jewish
immigrants; second, Israel is based on democratic principles. With
respect to the first principle, Israel was established following World War
II as a safe haven for exiled Jews. Between 1945 and 1948, thousands of
displaced European Jews who were persecuted and disadvantaged in
their home countries fled to Palestine. 27 The British authorities who
then controlled Palestine, however, severely limited immigration and
"interned many of the would-be immigrants to Palestine in detention
camps in Cyprus." 28
Jewish immigrants who attempted to relocate outside Palestine
faced similar difficulties. The Allies of World War II "offered no concrete
proposal for rescue" of the Jewish refugees and "feared an influx of
26. Declaration of Israel, supra note 13.
27. Refugee Law and Policy: Israel, supra note 18.
28. Refugees, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM'L MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article
.php?Moduleld=10005139 [https://perma.cc/4NHW-9A4S] (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
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refugees" in their own nations. 29 The United States strictly limited the
number of Jewish refugees it would accept; Great Britain itself limited
immigrant intake; Switzerland took approximately thirty thousand
Jews while rejecting a similar amount at its border; Spain took a limited
number of refugees that it quickly passed on to the Portuguese port of
Lisbon.30
It was not until Israel's establishment in 1948 that displaced Jews
all over the world had a place to go. Founded as a Jewish homeland
open for the "ingathering of the exiles,"3 1 the state absorbed nearly
140,000 Holocaust survivors in the years immediately following Israel's
establishment. 32 In addition, it has accepted "about 586,000 Jews from
Arab countries who were dispossessed of their homes both before and
after the establishment of Israel." 33 To date, Israel has continued to
admit immigrants from all over the world, including almost a million
Jews and their non-Jewish relatives. 34
As its second founding principle, Israel made a pledge "to freedom,
justice and peace . . . complete equality of social and political rights to
all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex . . . freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture." 35 Taken together,
Israel's two founding principles amount to a "paradoxical combination of
commitments to a racial and religious character and to democracy and
human rights."36 Although in a traditional democratic state, all
policies-including immigration policy-are based on a civic rationale,
ethnic bias in Israel's regulations leads to undemocratic, unequal status
of different ethnic groups. 37
Moreover, the majority and minority populations within Israel value
the state's two founding principles differently. The Palestinian-Israeli
minority fights for rights like equality, but historically has been
unsupportive of the State's Jewish definition.38 On the other hand,
although the Jewish majority in Israel supports democratic rights in
principle, it often hesitates to give non-Jewish Israelis an equal degree
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Declaration of Israel, supra note 13.
32. Refugee Law and Policy: Israel, supra note 18.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Declaration of Israel, supra note 13.
36. Wan, supra note 24, at 1346.
37. Justyna Stypiiska, Jewish Majority and Arab Minority in Israel-Demographic
Struggle, 157 POLISH Soc. REV. 105, 113 (2007).
38. See Gross, supra note 15, at 86.
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of those rights.39 One reason why is closely tied to the centuries-old
conflict in the Middle East: "the Arab minority within Israel is perceived
as a threat to the stability and continuity of a Jewish nation-State."40
How these conflicting interests affect minority rights in Israel is
especially apparent when we assess how rights are protected. In a
democracy, laws affecting minority rights are generally promulgated by
the legislative branch and interpreted by the courts. 41 Ultimately, the
Israel Supreme Court balances competing interests to achieve "an
optimal accommodation of minority-protection and majoritarian
goals."42 While doing so, the Court also focuses on the long-term goals of
the State. 43 In each case, the Supreme Court weighs not only one party's
interest against another but also those interests against the
fundamental ideals of the nation.
In the case of Israel, where neither the majority nor minority
populations fully support both of Israel's founding principles, the task of
properly balancing the competing interests presents a challenge. Adding
to the weight against the non-Jewish minority in cases where minority
interests conflict with majoritarian, Zionist principles, the Jewish
majority consistently dominates Israel's legislative and executive
branches. 44 Despite the Supreme Court's best efforts to be just, it may
legitimize discriminatory laws to serve one interest at the clear expense
of another. The definition of Israel in the Basic Laws as a "Jewish and
democratic state," for instance, may justify laws that discriminate
against non-Jewish Israelis. Because the Jewish majority dominates
Israel's government, strong incentives to preserve Israel's Zionist
motivations outweigh those to maintain its commitment to "complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of
religion, race or sex." 45
. 39. See Leora Bilsky, 'Speaking Through the Mask': Israeli Arabs and the Changing
Faces of Israeli Citizenship, 1 MIDDLE E. L. & GOVERNANCE 166, 168 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a Branch of Government, 3 ISR. STUD. 6, 12-15 (1998).
42. Leonard G. Ratner, Constitutions, Majoritarianism, and Judicial Review: The
Function of a Bill of Rights in Israel and the United States, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 373, 375
(1978).
43. See id.
44. See Peter Beinart, Why Arab Parties Are Excluded From Israeli Coalitions, DAILY
BEAST (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/30/why-
arab-parties-are-excluded-from-israeli-coalitions.html.
45. Declaration of Israel, supra note 13.
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II. RIGHTS PROTECTION IN ISRAEL
The struggle to protect minority rights amidst a government
controlled by the Jewish majority is compounded by Israel's lack of a
supreme constitution. Three bodies of law instead govern Israeli
individual rights: (1) Supreme Court precedents called the "judicial bill
of rights,"46 (2) a series of "Basic Laws" meant to form a makeshift
constitution, 47 and (3) additional legislation that embraces minority
rights.48 These laws often contain loopholes to permit violations of
individual rights in cases where Israel's Jewish character is at stake. 49
Without an overarching constitution rendering such provisions
intolerable, Israel's court of last resort has little basis for protecting
minority rights at the expense of Israel's Zionist mission.
A. Israel's Lack of a Constitution
Although Israel's Declaration of Independence stipulated that a
Constitution be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly not later than the
first day of October 1948, Israel has no formal constitution.5 0 After
Israel's formation, two factions raised objections to drafting and
implementing a constitution: first, the Mapai Party objected to a
constitution because it was hesitant to constrain the government's
power in any way;5 1 second, the religious parties "rejected the very idea
of anything but the Torah serving as the Jewish State's constitution." 52
The religious parties were also concerned that "a constitution with a
commitment to civil rights would infringe on religious legislation that
they supported." 53
The proponents and opponents of adopting a constitution eventually
reached a compromise: the Harari Resolution. 54 Under the Harari
46. Gross, supra note 15, at 84.
47. See id. at 82-83.
48. See id. at 94-95 (discussing a case where a law other than the Basic Laws was
reviewed for its infringement on freedom of occupation).
49. See id. at 88.
50. Declaration of Israel, supra note 13; see also Joshua Segev, Who Needs a
Constitution? In Defense of the Non-Decision Constitution-Making Tactic in Israel, 70 ALB.
L. REV. 409, 410 (2007).
51. Gross, supra note 15, at 81-82.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 82.
54. Id. at 81; see also SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTION OF ISRAEL: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 9 (Peter Leyland & Andrew Harding eds., 2014).
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Resolution, the Knesset, Israel's legislative body, was to promulgate a
series of "Basic Laws" in lieu of a formal constitution.5 5 Passed in the
1950s onward, these Basic Laws were meant to act as individual
chapters compiling a constitution.56 Most of the early Basic Laws,
however, dealt only with the institutional parts of government and not
civil or individual rights.5 7
To account for previously unprotected individual rights, the Knesset
passed Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in 1992, "which
guarantees the right to life, physical integrity, human dignity and
property, and freedom of movement from and to Israel."5 8 This Basic
Law includes a limitations clause that permits restriction of protected
rights "(1) by a law; (2) fitting the values of the State of Israel; (3)
designed for a proper purpose; and (4) to an extent no greater than
necessary, or pursuant to a law enacted with explicit authorization
therein."5 9 It also grants immunity from scrutiny to all legislation
existing before the Basic Law's enactment.60 These explicit loopholes
indicate that in some cases Israel may abandon its founding, democratic
principles in favor of protecting the state's Jewish character.
B. Judicial Activism Before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
Without a document that explicitly limits the authority of
government over the individual, the Israeli Supreme Court's role as
guardian of individual rights has historically been of particular
importance. Though meant to act as a constitution governing the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, Israel's early
Basic Laws did not provide its Supreme Court with the power of judicial
review as we know it in the United States today. During Israel's early
years, the permitted type of judicial review was limited to only
administrative action and not legislation.61
Despite its limited judicial review during this period, Israel's
Supreme Court scrutinized administrative acts that violated freedoms it
believed were basic rights of citizens. 62 Without legislation protecting
55. Gross, supra note 15, at 81.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 88.
59. Id. at 88-89 (citing Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 8 (1992)).
60. Id. at 89.
61. Id. at 84; see also Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for
Judicial Review and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 349, 381-82 (2012).
62. See Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution:
Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REv. 299, 316
(2003); Gross, supra note 15, at 85.
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individual rights until 1992, the Supreme Court "void[ed] parliamentary
resolutions and various executive actions, including decisions made by
cabinet ministers" that infringed upon the rights they identified.63 The
resulting line of precedents became termed the "judicial bill of rights"
and was used to determine cases where individual rights were in
question. 64
The paradigm for this type of rights protection was established in
the 1953 case, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior.6 5 Here, dealing with
a communist newspaper that was temporarily closed down by the
Minister of the Interior, the Court ruled that "the Minister could only
apply his discretion when there is a 'near certainty' of risk to public
safety."66
Aeyal Gross identifies three specific elements of the Kol Ha'am
opinion that influenced subsequent rights-conscious decisions and
illuminated the relationship between democratic freedoms, goals of
Israel as a state, and judicial intervention in Israel.67 First, the Supreme
Court conceptualized a bill of rights.6 8 In Kol Ha'am, the Supreme Court
recognized the freedom of speech by identifying it as a key component to
democracy and thus integral to the success of Israel as a democratic
state.6 9 Similarly, other cases recognized individual rights like equality
by drawing upon the democratic ideals enumerated in the Declaration of
Israel.7 0
Second, the Supreme Court exercised a form of judicial review.7 1 In
Kol Ha'am, the Court examined the case based solely on administrative
acts because legislative scrutiny was not accepted until the enactment
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 72 Nonetheless, the version of
judicial review the Court applied successfully protected the rights the
Supreme Court specifically identified. In this sense, the Supreme Court
63. Gross, supra note 15, at 85.
64. Id.; Rabin & Shany, supra note 62, at 316.
65. See Gross, supra note 15, at 84; HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior 7
PD 871 [1953] (Isr.). See generally Pnina Lahav, Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in
Israel Chief Justice Agranat's Legacy, 24 ISR. L. REV. 211 (1990) (discussing the
significance of the Kol Ha'am opinion as it relates to judicial review).
66. Gross, supra note 15, at 84.
67. Id.; see also Amos Shapira, The Supreme Court as the Defender of Fundamental
Civil Rights in Israel-A Protected Fortress or a Paper Tiger?, 3 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 625,
627 (1973).
68. Gross, supra note 15, at 84.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.; PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM-CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT
AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 116 (1997). See generally Lahav, supra note 65 (discussing the
significance of the Kol Ha'am opinion as it relates to judicial review).
72. See Gross, supra note 15, at 84.
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asserted its legitimacy as a democratic institution and protector of
rights.
Third, the Kol Ha'am decision balanced the rights of the petitioner
with the conflicting interest of the public.73 In doing so, the Supreme
Court demonstrated how commitments to both democratic rights and
larger state goals are not mutually exclusive, and the outcome of a
specific case depends on a balance between the two.74 Indeed, Kol Ha'am
suggested that Israel's Supreme Court was ready and willing to fulfill
its democratic role as a neutral arbiter of interests.
The proposition that the Supreme Court would faithfully preserve
Israel's commitment to democratic principles was rebuffed in
subsequent cases where the state's Jewish character was at stake.
Although the issue in Kol Ha'am did not directly posit democratic rights
against the Zionist goals of Israel, cases decided shortly after posited
such a dilemma. In Rogzinski et al. v. State of Israel,7 5 the Court
considered whether the requirement for Jews to marry in Israel under
Jewish religious law conflicts with freedom of religion and freedom of
conscience.76 The Supreme Court "held that when the legislature's
explicit will is obvious, the Court is required to uphold that will, even if
it conflicts with the rights outlined in the Declaration of
Independence."7 7 The court's conclusion that Israel's religious interests
outweighed the individual liberties at stake, however, was in large part
based on deference to the Knesset-a legislature unsurprisingly
dominated by the Jewish majority.
Similarly, in Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Elections
Committee to the Sixth Knesset,7 8 the Supreme Court upheld a Central
Elections Committee decision to disqualify the Arab Socialist Party from
running in elections.79 The Court based its ruling on its finding of "the
party platform to be a repudiation of the existence of the State."80 Like
in Rogzinski, the court ruled against the rights of its Palestinian
minority for reasons of protecting Israel's Jewish character.8 1 In both
cases, the democratic rights the minority petitioners sought were
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. HCJ 450/70 Rogzinski v. State of Israel 26(1) PD 129 (1970) (Isr.).
76. Gross, supra note 15, at 84.
77. Id.
78. HCJ 1/65, Yeredor v. Chairman of the Cent. Elections Comm. to the Sixth
Knesset, 19(3) PD 365 (1965) (Isr.).
79. LAHAV, supra note 71, at 181; Gross, supra note 15, at 84 (citing to Yoav Peled,
Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish
State, AM. POL. SC. REV., June 1992, at 432, for a discussion of the Yeredor case).




diminished in order to preserve a majoritarian founding purpose-
maintaining the definition of Israel as a Jewish State.
C. Israel's Constitutional Revolution
The Knesset's passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
sparked what is often called "the constitutional revolution" of Israel in
1992. Providing protection for the rights to life, liberty, honor, the
integrity of the body, private property, privacy, and movement in and
out of the country, the legislation supported the judicial bill of rights
that the Supreme Court had built leading up to Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty's adoption. 82 As a result, Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty created a great deal of excitement for those seeking
equal rights between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis.8 3
Still, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was not passed
without limitations. Similar to other Basic Law legislation, Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty is not entrenched, and subsequent
legislation can infringe upon it in accordance with a limitation clause. 84
Legislation may limit the rights contained in Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty if it is consistent with Israel's values as a Jewish
and democratic state, is enacted for a worthy purpose, and the
infringement is proportional to that purpose. 85 In addition, all
previously existing legislation is immune forever from scrutiny for its
accordance with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.86 Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty bases its limitation clause, in part, on the
contradictory principles of Israel as a Jewish, democratic state, which in
turn limits its effectiveness in providing the minority rights protections
for which activists had hoped.
Additionally, some scholars assert that the "definition of the State of
Israel in the Basic Laws as a 'Jewish and democratic state' may serve to
legitimize laws that discriminate in favor of Jews."8 7 Supreme Court
precedent suggests the same. 88 In Salhat v. The Government of Israel,8 9
82. See Doron Navot & Yoav Peled, Toward a Constitutional Counter-Revolution in
Israel?, 16 CONSTELLATIONS 429, 434 (2009).
83. See id.
84. See Basic Law: Human Dignity § 8 (Isr.), available at https://www.knesset.gov.il
1laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
85. Shimon Shetreet, Global Law Practice-Globalization from Below: National and
Regional Perspectives, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 109, 124
(Jens Drolshammer & Michael Pfeifer eds., 2001).
86. Gross, supra note 15, at 89.
87. Id. at 103.
88. Gross, supra note 15, at 104.
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the petitioners argued that the General Security Services used torture
mechanisms that infringed upon the petitioner's right to human dignity
under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.9 0 Instead of deciding on
the merits of the case, as critics suggest it should have, the Supreme
Court declined to issue an opinion until more specific, concrete cases
challenging the practices of the General Security Services were
presented.9 1 In Hamdan v. General Security Services92 and Mubarak v.
General Security Services,93 the minority petitioners challenged the
investigative practices of the Israeli General Security Services.
In Mubarak v. General Security Services, when Palestinian
petitioners asked the Court to instruct the General Security Services to
refrain from using torture in its investigations, the Court rejected the
petitions. 94 The Supreme Court's reasoning points to the problematic
definition of the State of Israel: the court was convinced these torture
mechanisms were a necessary measure to properly investigate citizens
thought to threaten the Jewish character of the state.95
Beyond these cases, the Court's willingness to apply Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty to protect the Israeli-Palestinian minority
has historically been sporadic at best: "petitions brought by Israeli-
Palestinians, citizens of the State of Israel, on civil rights issues, such as
freedom of speech, or on equality issues, have regularly been rejected by
the Court."96 Such trends make clear that Israel's dual definition as a
Jewish, democratic state containing a non-Jewish minority is
problematic. At a minimum, the dual definition has diminished the
Supreme Court's willingness to protect minority rights in cases where
doing so is at the expense of majoritarian interests and sacrifices one of
Israel's major founding principles. In the end, by preserving Israel's
Zionist mission, the Supreme Court sacrifices the state's democratic
character and fails to fully accomplish its role as a protector of minority
rights.
89. H.C. 2581/91, Murad Adnan Salhat et al. vs. The Government of Israel et al., 47(4)
PD 837-45 (1991) (Isr.).
90. Gross, supra note 15, at 104.
91. Id.
92. HC 8049/91 Hamdan v. General Security Services [unpublished] (Isr.).
93. HC 3124/69 Murabarak v. General Security Services [unpublished] (Isr.).
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 86 (citing HCJ 200/83, Watad v. Ministry of Treasury, 38(3) PD 113-25 (1983)
(Isr.); HCJ 114/79, Burkan v. Mister of Finance, 32(2) PD 800-08 (1979) (Isr.). See also
Ronen Shamir, Legal Discourse, Media Discourse, and Speech Rights: The Shift from
Content to Identity-The Case of Israel, 19 INT'L J. Soc. L. 45, 45-65 (1991)). See generally
DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1990).
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III. ISRAEL'S IMMIGRATION LAW
Israel has been termed "a land of immigrants."9 7 Of the roughly
eighty percent of the citizenry that is Jewish, a significant number are
foreign-born.9 8 Following the large influx of Jews born in the former
Soviet Union in the mid-1990s, approximately thirty-eight percent of
the Jewish population in Israel had been born outside the country.9 9 In
addition, one in every three Israelis was an immigrant.100 To compare
Israel's immigration statistics to the landscape in the United States, "'in
1997 nearly one in ten residents of the United States . . . was foreign-
born,' and that is in the context of one of the largest immigration waves
in United States history."10 1
Yet Israel is not uniformly welcoming of all immigrants from all
backgrounds. From 1948 to about 1980, Israel encouraged mass
migration of Jews to help support the Jewish State after its founding. 102
Adding to the encouragement, in the early 1950s, the Israeli Parliament
passed the Law of Return, 1950;103 the Nationality Law, 1952;104 and
the Entry into Israel Law, 1952.105 These provisions of Israeli
immigration law benefited Jewish immigrants who sought to settle in
Israel by providing flexible requirements for citizenship.1 06
In contrast, Israel's Knesset has also passed restrictive laws aimed
at limiting non-Jewish immigration. The Citizenship and Entry Into
Israel Law, 07 drafted in 2003 as a temporary measure, prevents
97. Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity,
13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 233 (1999).
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing 48 STAT. ABSTRACT OF ISR. 1997 at 49).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Born Population Reaches
25.8 Million, According to Census Bureau (Apr. 9, 1998) (on file with author)).
102. Eliott Rimon, Note, Infiltration or Immigration: The Legality of Israeli Immigration
Policy Regarding African Asylum Seekers, 23 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 447, 454-55
(2015).
103. Law of Return, 4 LSI 114 (Isr.)., available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org
/jsource/Politics/OtherLawLawofReturn.html.
104. Nationality Law, 5712-1952,§ 5, 6 LSI 50 (1948-1987) as amended (Isr.), available
at http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/nationalitylaw.htm.
105. Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, SH No. 1156 p. 213, available at http://www.ref
world.org/docid/3ae6b4ecO.html.
106. See id.; Law of Return, 4 LSI 114, § 1 (Isr.), available at http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/Politics/OtherLawLawofReturn.html; Nationality Law, 6 LSI 50, §
5 (Isr), available at http//www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ec20.html
107. Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision), 5763 - 2003,
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/specialleng/citizenshiplaw.htm
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residents of Palestinian territories from gaining Israeli citizenship. 08
"[T]he Prevention of Infiltration Act was originally enacted in 1954 to
address the phenomenon of Palestinian fedayeen, armed militia
members who attempted to infiltrate to attack Israeli targets, which
was considered to be a security threat at the time . . . ."109 As a deterrent
to immigration, the act was amended in 2012 to reach asylum seekers
from Africa who were entering Israel through its southern border and to
authorize their automatic detention.1 10
The difference between Israel's laws that encourage Jewish
Immigration and those that discourage other foreign settlers is stark. A
comparison between the Law of Return, on the one hand, and the
Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law and Prevention of Infiltration
Law, on the other, showcases how Israel simply cannot serve its Zionist
founding principle without sacrificing its democratic one.
A. Law of Return
The Law of Return is central to Israeli immigration law.1 1 ' By this
principle, Israel asserts that every Jew has a near-absolute claim to
settle in the country.11 2 Many scholars take differing views on how the
Law of Return affects Israel's existence. "Some claim that the Law of
Return is not only a central feature of Israeli immigration law, but an
essential constitutional feature of the Israeli state-one of the few legal
manifestations of Israel's nature as a Jewish state.""13 Others forcefully
maintain that the Law of Return is the state's raison d'etre:
[T]hey note that when in the European Jewry's darkest
hour, while fleeing extermination in Nazi death-camps,
the British (who maintained quasi-sovereign control
over the region under the League of Nations' mandate)
108. The Citizenship and Entry Law (Temporary Order), 2003, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 23, 2005), http://mfa.gov.ilIIMA/AboutIsrael/State/LawlPages/
Citizenship%20and%20Entry%2OLaw%20-Temporary%200rder-%202003.aspx.
109. Reuven Ziegler, The New Amendment to the 'Prevention of Infiltration' Act:
Defining Asylum-Seekers as Criminals, ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://en.idi.org.illanalysis/articles/the-new-amendment-to-the-prevention-of-infiltration-
act-defining-asylum-seekers-as-criminals; see also Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and
Jurisdiction) Law, 8 LSI 133 (Isr.), available at https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsou
rce[History/19541aw.pdf.
110. Ziegler, supra note 109.
111. Ernst, supra note 23, at 564.
112. Id.




refused all but a few of the Jewish immigrants seeking
refuge in the land that the British had previously
declared would serve as "a national home for the Jewish
people." 114
Whichever be the more accurate description of the Law of Return,
one thing is clear: the tenet encourages the free immigration of Jewish
people into Israel.
Some scholars have argued "that the Law of Return creates a clear-
cut differentiation between the civil rights of Jews and those of
Arabs.""15 Indeed, before the 1980 Amendment to Israel's Nationality
Law, "children born to Jewish Israeli citizens acquired citizenship by
Return even if they were born in Israel, while children born to non-
Jewish Israeli citizens acquired citizenship by birth, thus there was a
difference in how citizenship was acquired." 116 One justification for this
difference is the fact that a Jew's immigration to Israel allows that
person to join a "historical continuity of the Jewish community over
myriad generations"-a concept referred to as an individual's
"communal" good.117 By contrast, a non-Jew seeking entry into Israel
not only lacks the cultural and religious tie to Israel's stated founding
purpose, but also may disrupt the homogeneity of Israel's desired
community.
B. Citizenship and Entry into Israel
Despite the establishment of civil rights legislation in Israel, Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has proven particularly ineffective in
protecting Israeli-Palestinian rights in the case of Israel's Citizenship
and Entry into Israel Law. Though Israel initially passed the law in
2003 as a temporary measure, Israel has extended its authority
multiple times, and it is still in effect today.118 The law "prohibits
granting Israeli citizenship and residency to Palestinians from the West
114. Id. at 565 (citing Letter from Lord Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary of UK, to
Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917)).
115. Id. at 571 (referencing Yfaat Weiss, The Golem and Its Creator, or How the Jewish
Nation-State Became Multiethnic, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP: GERMAN AND
ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION 82-83 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss eds., 2002)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 576.
118. JNi.Media, Knesset Extends Law Limiting Arab Family Reunification in Israel,
JEWISH PRESS (June 14, 2016), http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/knesset-
extends-law-limiting-arab-family-reunification-in-israel/2016/06/14/.
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Bank and the Gaza Strip, and prevents, inter alia, Israeli Arabs from
living in Israel with their Palestinian spouses."" 9
From the perspective of Israeli-Palestinian citizens, the law
prevents their Palestinian spouses from entering the country in hopes of
obtaining a family life in Israel.120 In several cases brought before the
Israel Supreme Court, Palestinian petitioners have argued that such a
restriction erodes their basic democratic rights.121 Given that
Palestinian-Israelis are more frequently married to Palestinians in the
restricted locations, many argue that the law unequally discriminates
against the non-Jewish minority. 122
Though the Court has consistently affirmed the law because of the
security threat posed by some Palestinians who had gained citizenship
rights through marriage to Israeli citizens, some arguments against the
measure point to the nation's demographic goal of ensuring a Jewish
majority in Israel.123 As has often occurred in cases involving these
conflicting interests, the Court's decision to uphold the law is based on a
shift in focus away from the necessity of minority rights to the
protective benefit of the Jewish society at large. In his analysis of the
court's decision to extend the Citizenship and Entry into Israel law,
Ben-Shemesh discusses how "[i]mmigration and citizenship policies are
used as the main means to affect the demographic balance between
Jews and Palestinians in Israel."1 24 These demographic concerns of
respondents in the Citizenship Law cases, though supportive of Israel's
founding principles as a whole, clearly conflict with Israel's claimed
commitment to democratic values when it comes to minority petitioners'
rights. 125
These conflicting interests, even with proper rights legislation like
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, are difficult to balance without
compromising minority rights. As described by Navot and Peled, "the
curtailment of the Palestinian citizens' right to family unification,
presented as a temporary measure undertaken under a state of
exception, but affirmed by the Court as a permanent feature of Israel's
citizenship regime, may be only the first step in a long and dangerous
road."1 26
119. See Ben-Shemesh, supra note 15, at 1.
120. Charlotte Silver, Palestinian Families Denied Rights by Israel's Racist Marriage




123. See Bilsky, supra note 39, at 167-69.
124. See Ben-Shemesh, supra note 15, at 5.
125. See id at 7.
126. Navot & Peled, supra note 83, at 442.
270
IRRECONCILABLE PRINCIPLES
D. Prevention of Infiltration Law
Israel's Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) LaW127
is designed to "improve the security at the state borders and the general
security by improving the legal measures that are used against
infiltrators." 128 "Infiltrators" are "persons who are not Israeli residents,
do not possess an Olehl29 or a permanent residence visa, and have
entered Israel via a border that has not been designated as an
international border crossing by the Minister of Interior." 13 0
Although Israel has no state-based legal structure that governs
immigrants seeking asylum, it amended the Prevention of Infiltration
Law in 2012 to apply to many of the African asylum seekers who have
sought safety in Israel since 2004.131 Under the law, asylum-seekers can
be held in a detention camp in the desert for up to twenty months.132
Some activists argue that "[tihe purpose of the law is to coerce the
asylum-seekers into 'voluntarily' leaving Israel, since Israel cannot
deport them by force."1 33
Immigrants who manage to avoid detention under the Law and join
Israeli society, however, still face serious obstacles in achieving the
same quality of life as the Jewish majority. African immigrants battle
severe racism, 134 police brutality, 35 difficulty securing housing,1 36 and
an overall lower economic status.1 37 "The asylum-seekers, who make up
about 0.5% of Israel's population, are also presented as a demographic
127. Prevention of Infiltration, 8 LSI 133 (Isr.), available at https://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/History/19541aw.pdf.
128. Refugee Law and Policy: Israel, supra note 18 (internal citation omitted).
129. An Oleh's visa is granted to "every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in
Israel" and often his family members. The Law of Return, 4 LSI 114 (Isr.), available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Pohtics/OtherLaw-Law-ofReturn.html.
130. Refugee Law and Policy: Israel, supra note 18; see also Prevention of Infiltration, 8
LSI 133, §1 (Isr.), available at https/www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgjsource/History/19541aw.pdf
131. Refugees, THE HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS, httpi/hotline.org.il/en/refugees-
and-asylum-seekers-en/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ruth Eglash, Violence Erupts as Thousands of Ethiopian Israelis Protest Racism,
WASH. POST (May 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/
05/03/thousands-of-ethiopian-israelis-protest-police-brutality.
135. Id.
136. Ruth Eglash, Ethiopian Israelis Protest Racism in Kiryat Malachi, JERUSALEM
WORLD NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012), httpJ/jerusalemworldnews.com/2012/01/10/ethiopian-israelis-
pbotest-racism-in-kiryat-malachil.
137. William Booth, Israeli Government to Refugees: Go Back to Africa or Go to Prison,
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and a security threat."13 8 The State and many Israeli media outlets use
the language of the Prevention of Infiltration Law to label the
immigrants as "infiltrators," a term originally used for Palestinian
refugees who entered Israel in the 1950s to commit sabotage and terror
attacks. 139
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS, IMMIGRATION, AND THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE
Immigration, entering another country, and emigration, leaving one
country, go hand-in-hand. With the exception of Russia in the 1980s,
"all civilized modern states are imbued with the firm belief that
the right to emigrate is one of the inalienable rights belonging to each
citizen, and that each person is free to change nationality." 140 Scholars
assert that this widely recognized freedom to emigrate is "the direct
consequence of the new social and political order which has at its
foundation respect for human beings and the interests that concern
them."141 One reason for emigration from a country and immigration to
another is often mistreatment in the home nation. 142 These emigrants
and immigrants perhaps leave a country where their civil rights are
compromised in hope of finding a better life elsewhere. As some describe
it, however, "emigration causes a disruption in the community, resulting
in the alienation of the emigrant from her home." 143 Displacement of
refugees and immigrants alike also affects the nations receiving
them.144 As a result, both the state and the newly entered persons
struggle to find a way to make the change more smoothly and allow
immigrants to transition into their new society.
One potential result of Israel's inconsistent treatment of the non-
Israeli minority, the State's immigration policies favoring Jews, and the
troubles associated with asylum seekers is placing the burden on
neighboring countries to accept Israeli emigrants and African asylum
seekers. Still, statistics show emigration rates from Israel are fairly
138. Refugees, supra note 131.
139. Id.
140. Jeffrey Barist et al., Who May Leave: A Review of Soviet Practice Restricting
Emigration on Grounds of Knowledge of "State Secrets" in Comparison with Standards of
International Law and the Policies of Other States, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 381, 385 (1987).
141. Id.
142. See id at 408-38; John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the
Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of
Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 424 (2002).
143. Michael Scaperlanda. Immigration and Evil: The Religious Challenge, 83 U. DET.




moderate. 145 As of October 2012, Israel had "the lowest emigration rates
since the founding of the state in 1948."146 It is difficult to say, however,
what proportion of emigrating Israelis are of the State's non-Jewish
minority. 147
Despite the relatively poor treatment of the non-Jewish minority,
recent studies indicate that Israeli Arabs are happy where they are.
"According to polls, 77 percent of Israeli Arabs prefer to live in Israel
while only 21 percent want to live in a Palestinian state."1 48 One
plausible explanation draws upon the deep historical tie many
Palestinian-Israelis have to the land. 149 Regardless of their status as a
relatively unprotected minority, Arab Israelis may feel too personally
connected to the Middle East Conflict to leave.
African asylum-seekers, however, present a more serious problem
for the global landscape. Israel has one of the lowest asylum acceptance
rates in the Western world. 50 The State accepts less than one percent of
all who seek asylum there. 151 Moreover, those who do enter Israeli
society are likely to leave as soon as they are able to find safety in their
home state or elsewhere. In some cases, Israel has offered to pay those
seeking asylum to leave Israel and seek safety outside the state, often in
their home countries. 152 As one source describes, "Israel's policy toward
African asylum-seekers is to pressure them to self-deport or, as the
former interior minister Eli Yishai put it, to 'make their lives miserable'
until they give up and let the government deport them."1 53 The reason
for Israel's harsh treatment of its asylum-seekers is unsurprising;
according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, "If we don't stop
their entry, the problem that currently stands at 60,000 could grow to
145. Yinon Cohen, Israeli-Born Emigrants: Size, Destinations and Selectivity, 52 INT'L J.
COMP. SOC. 45, 45 (2011) ("[R]elative to other countries, the share of Israeli-born residing
outside Israel is not high.").
146. Israeli Emigration Rates at All-Time Low, TIMES ISRAEL (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:46 PM),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-emigration-rates-at-all-time-low/.
147. Although perhaps an indication of emigration patterns rather than frequency
Arabs are overrepresented among Israeli-born over fifty-five years old in the United
States. Cohen, supra note 146, at 61 n.11.
148. Jonathan Adelman, The Israeli Arabs: Trailblazers of a Better Middle East,
HUFFINGTON POST: WORLD POST (Aug. 19, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.m
/jonathan-adelman/the-israeli-arabs-trailb-b8010020.html.
149. See id.
150. Malin Fezehai, Israel's Chilly Reception for African Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/31/opinion/sunday/exposures-
israel-chilly-reception-for-african-asylum-seekers.html?_r-1.
151. Can Israel Have a Fair Asylum Law Without Confronting the Nakba?, supra note
20.
152. Fezehai, supra note 150.
153. Id.
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600,000, and that threatens our existence as a Jewish and democratic
state."1 54
That Israel accepts such a small number of asylum-seekers puts the
burden on other countries to take in more immigrants than they
otherwise would. The number of African asylum-seekers across the
globe is astronomical, and many countries already struggle to
accommodate all who need protection.15 5 As an attempted remedy, the
European Union recently announced that it would give financial
support to African frontline states that are expected to take on the
burden of hosting migrants who cannot seek asylum in Europe.156
Although Israel might consider following suit, this paternalistic
approach has its criticisms. 15 7 Accepting asylum-seekers and treating
them as citizens of the accepting state is always preferred. 158
CONCLUSION
"Our constitution reflects the profound concepts of Israeli society; it
protects both the ruling structures and human rights, and balances the
collective good against that of the individual. It is the role of the judge to
preserve this structure of constitutional balancing." 159 Former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel Aharon Barak emphasized the
role of the judiciary in maintaining a balance between individual
liberties and State goals, a process that was developed well before Israel
even passed formal rights legislation. 16 0
The balancing process developed to protect these rights, however, is
complicated by Israel's irreconcilable founding principles. Through its
limited judicial review in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court demonstrated
a commitment to Israel's democratic ideals, yet its application of
protections to non-Jewish citizens, and Palestinians in particular,
indicates these ideals may conflict with the State's Jewish definition.
In addition, although the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
solidified the rights that Israel's democratic society sought to protect,
instances where the Supreme Court declined to extend those securities
to Israeli-Palestinians show that the Jewish character of Israel conflicts
154. Id.
155. See Andrew Maina, The Migration Crisis and African Asylum Seekers, WORLD









with its democratic principles. Moreover, the final example of the
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law demonstrates just how
detrimental Israel's incompatible founding principles can be to minority
interests, especially when it comes to immigration law.
Yet Israel's treatment of minority rights spurs more than purely
local effects. All over the world, countries who accept immigrants and
asylum-seekers that otherwise would settle in Israel appreciate the
consequences of Israel's irreconcilable principles. As the Supreme Court
sanctions undemocratic measures to protect the State's Jewish citizens,
non-Jewish Israelis and prospective immigrants, even those who are
unsupportive of, or unconnected, to violence against Jewish Israelis,
endure the consequences.
Ben-Shemesh asserts, "Preserving the Jewish majority in Israel is
justified only to the extent that it is justified for Israel to attempt to
maintain its Jewish nature." 61 But is the neglect of democratic
principles and minority rights justified by Israel's Jewish nature? If so,
the question of compatibility of these two principles should be placed
within a broader context-the attempt to reconcile democracy with
Jewish nationalism. In light of the Israel Supreme Court's questionable
effectiveness in reconciling the principles thus far, combined with the
state of affairs in the Middle East and Africa, the future of Israel may
be marked by a retreat from its founding principles in the name of
Zionism, or else worldwide consequences for asylum seekers and the
nations strained to accept them will persist.
161. Ben-Shemesh, supra note 15, at 8.
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